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The Saddam Oil Contracts and What Can Be Done
Sandra T. Vreedenburgh*
I. INTRODUCTION
On the evening of March 19, 2003, President Bush addressed the
nation in a televised speech in which he stated, "American and coali-
tion forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq,
to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger."1 Oper-
ation Iraqi Freedom has since been a subject of great debate and criti-
cism. 2 Although Saddam Hussein is no longer in power and an
interim government is in place, questions remain unanswered con-
cerning the future of Iraq. The answers will depend on how Iraq con-
tends with its history and Saddam Hussein's past actions with respect
to Iraq's oil industry as oil once was, and can be again, the largest
source of natural wealth for the country. 3 The purpose of this paper is
to analyze the status of the Saddam Contracts, to understand why they
are being challenged and to offer compromises on how Iraq's oil in-
dustry should be handled with the best interests of the Iraqis in mind.
The nations which are parties to the Saddam Contracts4 are battling
for recognition of the Saddam Contracts in order to preserve their
initial and future investments worth billions of dollars. 5 They do so by
scrutinizing and questioning the actions and motives of the United
States. In response, the United States, suggests that the people of Iraq
* Sandra Vreedenburgh graduated from Tulane School of Law in May 2000, and is a licensed
attorney in Louisiana. She received an L.L.M in International Business and Trade Law in June
2003 from The John Marshall Law School in Chicago through the auspices of the Leo Melamed
Fellowship. She would like to thank Mr. Melamed for his generosity and support, as well as
Professor Michael P. Avramovich for his guidance and advice in writing this article.
1. President Bush, President Bush Addresses the Nation (Mar. 19, 2003), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/print/20030319-17.html.
2. Jared Sandberg, Cubicle Front Lines: U.N. Staffers Listen to an Agitated Public, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 26, 2003, at B1, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3962909. See also War Draws Ire, Support
From Unlikely Places, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2003, at A12, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3962526
(explaining that the war on Iraq is also a subject of criticism outside the United States).
3. The oil contracts of Saddam Hussein's regime, whether simply negotiated or actually en-
tered into, will be referred to as the "Saddam Contracts."
4. Hereinafter referred to as the "Pre-War Multinationals".
5. See http://www.msnbc.com/modules/iraqoil/contracts/default.htm (listing the known con-
tracts as of December 2002, the estimated developments costs and the daily production
statistics).
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need to decide the future of their oil industry, and that contrary to
what the Pre-War Multinationals allege, the United States does not
want the oil for itself.6 This paper will illustrate that the Pre-War Mul-
tinationals will find it difficult to win this battle against the United
States.
Before addressing the topics of this paper, it is necessary to under-
stand the history of Iraq's oil industry. Section II begins with an over-
view of this history and concludes with the events that led to, and a
description of, the Pre-War Multinational investments. Section III is
divided into two parts: Part A not only analyzes the legitimacy of the
Saddam Contracts, it illustrates that the issue of legitimacy is at the
core of events surrounding Iraq's oil industry. From Operation Iraqi
Freedom and the fall of Saddam, to the liberation of the Iraqis and the
election of a permanent Iraqi government, legitimacy must be debated
and established in order for Iraq to rebuild and develop. Recognizing
that legitimacy is at the forefront of the debate regarding Iraq's oil
industry explains why the status of the Saddam Contracts is ques-
tioned in Part B. In Section IV A extreme alternatives are presented.
These alternatives are extreme in that, rather than benefiting Iraq, the
Pre-War Multinationals, and the United States, they only benefit one
or two of the parties, at the expense of the other. In Section B a
different set of alternatives is addressed. This paper finds a middle
ground and offers compromises from which all three parties can bene-
fit. The analysis does not end here, as Iraq has an insurmountable
amount of debt with which it has to contend through proceeds of its
only source of wealth, its oil. How Iraq's debt is handled will have a
direct impact on the future of its oil industry and will impact any past,
present and future investments of foreign multinational companies.
Section V provides three alternatives that will be beneficial to Iraq
and its debt-holders without crippling the oil industry.
II. PRE-WAR MULTINATIONAL INVESTMENTS
Iraq has experienced a tumultuous history under various foreign
rulers. 7 Under a mandate established after World War I, Britain
placed Faisal on the throne of Iraq, and Iraq's 1924 Constitution cre-
ated a parliamentary monarchy which provided Britain with indirect
6. Marcus Walker, et al., Why Greed Isn't Driving U.S. or Europe Over Iraq, WALL ST. J., Feb.
14, 2003, at A6, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3959434.
7. Introduction in HISTORY OF IRAQ, at 1 at http://www.countryreports.org/history/
iraqhist.htm (last visited Nov. 2003).
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control.8 Because Faisal was not an Iraqi, and a monarchy was a for-
eign concept to the people of Iraq, he was unable to gain the Iraqis'
confidence and consequently, political instability was fueled and
lasted into the 1970's. 9 In 1932, Iraq became a sovereign nation, yet it
remained under a British-created monarchy and it was still mired with
ethnic, religious, economic, and political conflicts. 10 The discontent
towards the monarchy culminated in a military revolution in 1958
which placed General Abd al Karim Qasim as the ruler of the new
Republic of Iraq.1 Qasim's inability to quell the existing political in-
stability and ethnic conflicts led to his overthrow by the Baath party a
year later.12 In 1970, the Baath party issued a Provisional Constitu-
tion as a means to institutionalize its rule which culminated in Saddam
Hussein's presidency in 1979.13 For decades, Saddam corrupted the
judicial system, 14 dealt ruthlessly with any opposition to his rule and
his party,15 and kept Iraq in constant conflict in order to rule by exec-
utive order and keep Iraq in a state of national emergency. 16
In spite of Saddam's dictatorship, Iraq's oil industry experienced ex-
pansion under his regime.17 Oil was first discovered in Iraq in 1927.18
However, between 1927 and the early 1950's, the IPC19 consortium
restricted expansion of Iraqi oil because the major partners 20 of the
8. World War I and the British Mandate in HISTORY OF IRAQ, at 4-5 at http://
www.countryreports.orghistory/iraqhist.htm (last visited Nov. 2003).
9. Id. at 4.
10. Iraq as an Independent Monarchy in HISTORY OF IRAQ, at 1 at http://
www.countryreports.org/history/iraqhist.htm (last visited Nov. 2003) (explaining there were con-
flicts between Sunni and Shia tribes, Assyrians and Kurds, pan-Arabists and Iraqi nationals).
11. Republican Iraq in HISTORY OF IRAQ, at 1 at http:/www.countryreports.org/historyl
iraqhist.htm (last visited Nov. 2003).
12. Coups, Coup Attempts, and Foreign Policy in HISTORY OF IRAQ, at 1 at http://
www.countryreports.orglhistory/iraqhist.htm (last visited Nov. 2003).
13. The Emergence of Saddam Husayn, 1968-79 in HISTORY OF IRAQ, at 1-2 at http://
www.countryreports.org/history/iraqhist.htm (last visited Nov. 2003).
14. Marcia Coyle, Toward an Iraqi Legal System, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 25, 2003, available at http://
www.law.com (quoting Sermid AI-Sarraf, an Arab-American solo practitioner in Los Angeles).
15. The Baath Party in HISTORY OF IRAQ, at 1 at http://www.countryreports.orglhistory/
iraqhist.htm (last visited Nov. 2003).
16. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebuilding the Law in Iraq, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2003, available at
http://petroleumworld.com/storylO04.htm.
17. Dr. Fadhil J. Chalabi, The Victimization of Iraqi Oil, 18 No.10 Middle E. Executive Rep.
14 (Oct. 1995).
18. Id.
19. IPC stands for Iraq Petroleum Company Limited which was created in 1929.
20. James A. Paul, Oil in Iraq: The Heart of the Crisis, Global Policy Forum (Dec. 2002),
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/oil/2002/12heart.htm (explaining that predeces-
sors of BP Amoco (UK), Royal Dutch Shell (UK), Chevron Texaco (US) and TotalFinaElf
(France) controlled the IPC until nationalization in 1972).
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consortium could find cheaper oil elsewhere2' and focused their atten-
tion in developing those markets. It wasn't until the nationalization
acts of 1972-74 that Iraq's oil industry grew and developed with the
Baath party's demand that Iraq's oil fields be explored and discov-
ered. 22 Another result of this nationalization was that oil multination-
als lost control of the oil business in Iraq.23 Prior to 1972, because
these multinationals controlled oil production, known as "upstream,"
they kept most of the profits and gave the producer governments only
a small share. 24 Once Iraq nationalized its oil industry, it took control
over its own oil production.25 Consequently, the multinational oil
companies were forced to upstream elsewhere, such as in the North
Sea and West Africa, in order to maintain their level of profits.26 But
because production costs were higher and less money was being made,
these corporations eventually abandoned upstream to move towards
more profit-making activities, known as "downstream," such as refin-
ing, retailing, transportation of tankers and pipelines, and petrochemi-
cals.27  Meanwhile, back in Iraq, in spite of the loss of foreign
investment, the oil industry expanded, but this growth was short-lived
for two reasons. First, rather than being distributed to the Iraqi peo-
ple who could then re-invest their wealth in Iraq, the oil revenues
were constantly diverted to Saddam Hussein and the members of the
Baath party in what is described as a "highly organized form of insti-
tutional plunder. ' 28 Second, the eight-year Iran-Iraq War which be-
gan in 1980 and the Gulf War that resulted from Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait in 1990 crippled the oil industry and the ensuing U.N. sanc-
tions marked the end of this expansion.29
During the 1990's, multinational oil corporations reconsidered up-
stream as a means of making money through arrangements that would
give them shares of crude oil reserves. 30 Foreign investors looked to
Iraq's oil industry once again. They began to negotiate and enter into
oil contracts with Iraq in the hopes of reaping huge profits once the
21. Chalabi, supra note 17.
22. Id. See also Iraq: Law Nationalizing the Iraq Petroleum Company, 11 I.L.M. 846 (1972).
23. James A. Paul, Iraq: The Struggle for Oil, Global Policy Forum (Aug. 2002) (revised Dec.
2002), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/oil/2002/08jim.htm.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Chalabi, supra note 17.
27. Paul, supra note 23.
28. Dr. Leo Drollas, Give Iraqi Oil to the Iraqis, VOL. XLVI, No. 36 Sept. 8, 2003, available at
http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/a46n36dO2.htm (last visited Nov. 2003).
29. Chalabi, supra note 17.
30. Paul, supra note 23.
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U.N. sanctions were lifted. 31 Some of these Pre-War Multinationals
are as follows: CNPC of China for the Al-Ahdab oil field,32 Pe-
troVietnam for the Amara oil field,33 LUKoil of Russia for the West
Qurna field,34 Tatneft, Soyuzneftegaz and Stroytransgas-Oil of Russia
for the Rafidian field,35 TotalFinaElf of France for Bin Umar,36
Pertamina of Indonesia for exploration of Block 3 of Western De-
sert, 37 and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation of India for exploration
of Block 4 of Western Desert.38 This list is not inclusive, yet it illus-
trates that monumental investments in Iraqi oil have been made by
multinational corporations worldwide. Also illustrated by this list is
the fact that it appears that the United States holds no direct oil con-
tracts with Iraq. Consequently, the Pre-War Multinationals reason
that this is why the United States can easily claim that the Saddam
Contracts should be invalidated with the rise of a new Iraqi govern-
ment. The Pre-War Multinationals explain, however, that the Saddam
Contracts were not fictitious and do not simply disappear because of a
change in regime. The United States, while appreciating the Pre-War
Multinationals' view, can counter on the grounds of legitimacy
thereby illustrating that its suggestion of invalidation is not selfishly
motivated. 39
III. LEGITIMACY AND SADDAM CONTRACTS
In May 2003, the United States appointed Thamir Ghadhban as the
interim head of Iraq's oil ministry.40 On May 24, 2003 Mr. Ghadhban
either suspended or cancelled at least three Saddam Contracts, and
stated that the remaining Saddam Contracts would be examined on
their economic and legal merits.41 These actions and statements illus-
trate "that there will be two fronts for challenging old contracts - a
legal front in which the legitimacy of the contracts is questioned, and a
31. Id.
32. See http://www.msnbc.com/modules/iraqoilcontracts/default.htm (listing the known con-
tracts as of Dec. 2002).
33. Id.
34. Paul, supra note 23.
35. Energy Information Association, Iraq Country Analysis Brief, available at http://
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iraq.html.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Interim Head of Iraq's Oil Ministry Suspends First Pre-War Contracts, 8 ALEXANDER'S
GAS & OIL CONNECrIONS 12 (June 13, 2003), available at http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/com-
pany/cnm32480.htm [hereinafter Pre-War Contracts].
40. Chip Cummins et al., Timetable for Iraq Oil Contracts Is Unclear, WALL ST. J., May 20,
2003, at A16, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3968099.
41. Pre-War Contracts, supra note 39.
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broader economic front in which the ministry likely will claim that
deals made under Hussein were politically motivated and were not
economically fair for Iraq."' 42 Section A, infra, focuses on the legal
front with an analysis of whether Saddam Hussein was a legitimate
ruler. Section B, infra, then summarizes the status of the Saddam
Contracts in light of the questions of legitimacy. With regard to the
economic front, Mr. Ghadhban's statements are consistent with the
Doctrine of Odious Debts. Alexander Sack, a Franco-Russian legal
theorist of the twentieth century, gave shape to the legal doctrine of
odious debts, which will be discussed in more detail in Section V.
Briefly, this doctrine espoused the theory "that liability for public
debts should remain intact, for these debts represent obligations of the
state."' 43 According to Sack, odious debts, however, are debts in-
curred and not used for the benefit of the citizens of the state.44 Con-
sequently, they should be repudiated by the new government. 45 Iraq,
in order to rebuild and survive, must be able to determine the fate of
its oil.46 Yet advocating the continuity of the Saddam Contracts draws
an analogous situation with odious debts. The Saddam Contracts
were entered into by Saddam Hussein for his benefit.47 By requiring
the Iraqis to honor those contracts would be analogous to forcing citi-
zens of a country to repay the debts incurred by its dictator without
their consent. In many countries, "individuals do not have to repay if
others fraudulently borrow in their name, and corporations are not
liable for contracts that their chief executive officers or other agents
enter into without the authority to bind the corporations. ' 48  Like-
wise, the Saddam Contracts were entered into without the consent of
the Iraqi people and should, therefore, be subjected to thorough ex-
amination in order to determine which ones will truly benefit Iraq as a
whole.
42. Id.
43. PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD
WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY Chapter 17 (Toronto: Earthscan, 1991), excerpt available at
http://www.odiousdebts.org.
44. ALEXANDER SACK, Les effets des transformations des Etats sur leurs dettes publiques et
autres obligations financiers, Recuil Sirey (1927).
45. Id.
46. Abbas Alnasrawi, What Economic Future for Iraq?, 19 No. 3 MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP.
8 at 13 (1996).
47. Drollas, supra note 28.
48. Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, Odious Debt, 39 FIN. & DEV. MAG., June 2002,
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ftlfandd/2002/06/kremer.htm.
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A. Legitimacy
The Saddam Contracts are challenged because Saddam Hussein's
reign is challenged on the theory that "[t]he legitimacy of contracts
with sovereign nations ultimately rests upon the legitimacy of the na-
tions' rulers, who, in effect, act as agents for the state. '49 In other
words, if a government or ruler is not legitimate, any decisions or ac-
tions it takes should not be recognized, enforced or validated by its
citizens, by other nations or by multinational corporations.
Some may argue that a summary of Saddam Hussein's rise to power
illustrates that the legitimacy of his regime may be highly questiona-
ble. The Revolution of 1958 marked the beginning of a period of
coups and coup attempts.50 For example, General Qasim was in
power until he was assassinated in 1963 by the Baath party and re-
placed with Colonel Abdul Salam Arif as President.51 Shortly thereaf-
ter, President Arif ousted the Baath government. 52 In 1968, the Baath
party regained control, overthrew the Arif regime, and designated
Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr as President of Iraq and Chairman of the Rev-
olutionary Command Council (RCC).53 In 1979, President and Chair-
man al-Bakr named Saddam Hussein his successor. 54 The Provisional
Constitution of 1970 gave ultimate authority to the Baath regime,55
and the Baath party ruled through the RCC which enacted legislation
by decree.56 Since then, Saddam Hussein ruled by fiat. 57 The fact that
Saddam Hussein has been re-elected again and again58 is problematic
as some may argue that these national elections illustrate his legiti-
mate rule. In 1995, Saddam Hussein won 99.6% of the vote, or one
voter in about 3,000 voted against him.59 In 2002, he won 100% of the
vote.60 In reality, however, Saddam Hussein has been the only candi-
49. Lawrence Solomon, Iraq's Odious Debts, NAT'L POST (CANADA), Dec. 2, 2003, available
at http://www.jubilee2OOuk.org/worldnews/asia/iraql20203.htm.
50. Coups, Coup Attempts, and Foreign Policy, supra note 12 at 1.
51. U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Profile: Iraq (Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm [hereinafter Iraq Profile].
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Robert Perito, U.S. Inst. of Peace, Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq (Apr. 2003), avail-
able at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srlO4.html.
56. Iraq Profile, supra note 51.
57. Perito, supra note 55.
58. See Reuters, No Surprise in Iraqi Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1995, at A10; John F. Burns,
Threats and Responses: Baghdad; From Its Palaces, Iraq's View Is of a World Filled With Allies,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, at sec. 1, 1.
59. Reuters, supra note 58 at A10.
60. Michael Rubiner, Saddam Hussein, by a Whisker, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2002, at A17.
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date, the Kurds, the primary opposition, were not required to vote,61
and the ballots had the following "single question, 'Do you choose to
re-elect Saddam Hussein?' followed by the choices, a) Yes or b)
Yes."' 62 These election tactics, coupled with "a sophisticated security
structure, a vast network of informers, and extreme brutality in deal-
ing with dissent, '63 permitted Saddam Hussein to create a dictatorship
which can be described as a reign of terror, election or no election. It
is reasonable to conclude that Saddam Hussein was a dictator who
ruled without the consent of the Iraqis, and as a result, he lacked con-
stitutional legitimacy. 64
Based on this history and the unique election methods, it is not un-
reasonable for the United States to classify the Saddam Contracts as
illegitimate, as they stem from an illegitimate ruler who never had the
authority to enter into them, and suggest their invalidation. The Pre-
War Multinationals, in turn, in an attempt to preserve their contracts,
allege that the United States' attack on Iraq and subsequent establish-
ment of the interim government face the same legitimacy scrutiny be-
cause the attack had no explicit approval from the U.N. Security
Council. 65 They argue that, without U.N. approval, the United States'
unilateral attack lacked legitimacy, 66 as re-enforced by Secretary Gen-
eral Kofi Annan's statement to the U.N. General Assembly on Sep-
tember 12, 2003, that "there is no substitute for the unique legitimacy
provided by the United Nations." 67 Without a legitimate attack, any
subsequent action, such as the creation of an interim government,
would not be valid either.
This point of view, however, may be too rigid as the U.S. attack can
not be classified as unilateral simply because it did not have the sup-
port of Germany, Russia, or France.68 In reality, the United States
was supported by what has been referred to as the "coalition of the
61. Saddam 'Wins 100% ofVvote,' BBC NEWS, Oct. 16, 2002 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/mid-
dle_east/2331951.stm
62. Rubiner, supra note 60 at A17.
63. Perito, supra note 55.
64. Saddam Crimes, at http:/www.sciri.btinternet.co.uk/English/SaddamCrimes/saddam-
crimes.html.
65. Robert S. Greenberger & Jess Bravin, The Assault on Iraq: War May Confirm With Law,
But U.S. Prestige May Suffer, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2003, at A13, available at 2003 WL-WSJ
3962350.
66. Windy Soldiers, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2002 available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/
issues/iraq/2002/0808windy.htm.
67. Secretary General Kofi Annan, Special Iraq Coverage, Address to General Assembly of
the United Nations (Sept. 12, 2003) available at http://www.una-usadanecounty.org/publications/
index.php?category-id.
68. War Draws Ire, Support From Unlikely Places, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2003, at A12, availa-
ble at 2003 WL-WSJ 3962526.
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willing" which comprises of Britain, Australia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Ku-
wait, Oman, Qatar,69 and at least forty other nations.70 Further, there
were at least a dozen resolutions passed by the United Nations prior
to Operation Iraqi Freedom through which the United States may
glean authorization for its actions.71 The end of the Gulf War was
marked by U.N. Resolution 687 which established that Iraq would un-
conditionally agree to destroy its weapons of mass destruction.72 De-
spite its acceptance, Iraq refused to comply with the inspections and
monitoring conditions imposed by the resolution.73 Subsequently, the
U.N. passed resolution after resolution concerning Iraq's disarma-
ment. 74 A Joint Resolution, passed in October of 2002, authorized the
President of the United States "to take appropriate action" in order to
bring Iraq into compliance, and it recalled U.N. Resolution 687 which
authorized "the use of all necessary means" to compel Iraq to dis-
arm.75 In November of 2002, Resolution 1441 was passed as "a final
opportunity [for Iraq] to comply with its disarmament obligation [or]
face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its
obligations. ' 76 The stated objectives of this resolution were to "re-
store international peace and security [and] to ensure full and immedi-
ate compliance by Iraq. ' '77 In light of Iraq's "unremitting policy of
concealment and resistance, ' 78 coupled with the resolutions passed
concerning its defiance, it can be argued that the United States had all
the authority necessary to mount Operation Iraqi Freedom.
For those who remain unconvinced, Resolution 1483, passed in May
of 2003, can be viewed as concluding the debate as to whether the
U.S. attack was legitimate or not. Historically, the U.N. has granted
retroactive approval to invasions as illustrated with the U.S.-led inva-
69. Jonathan D. Tepperman, No Amnesty For Saddam, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2003, at A16,
available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3957591.
70. Au Revoir Security Council, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2003, at A14, available at 2003 WL-
WSJ 3962559.
71. Paul Schott Stevens, Why Bother?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2002. at A10, available at 2002
WL-WSJ 3409865.
72. United Nations Security Council: Resolution Affirming Earlier Resolutions and Setting
Forth Terms of Cease-Fire, 30 I.L.M. 846 (1991).
73. Stevens, supra note 71 at A14.
74. Id. See also Saddam Hussein's Deception and Defiance, Dec. 3, 2003, available at http:/l
www.c-span.org/iraq/timeline.asp.
75. United States Congress: Public Law 107-243 (Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of
United States Armed Forces Against Iraq), 41 I.L.M. 1440 (2002).
76. United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1441 (The Situation Between Iraq and Ku-
wait), 42 I.L.M. 250 (2003).
77. Id.
78. Stevens, supra note 71, at A14.
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sion of Kosovo in 1999. 79 Likewise, Resolution 1483 not only reaf-
firmed the necessity of Iraq's disarmament, but it recognized that the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland are occupying pow-
ers with which the United Nations and the people of Iraq need to
work in order to reaffirm the sovereignty of Iraq.80 In essence, the
U.S.-led attack on Iraq and its subsequent occupation of Iraq have
been recognized by the United Nations. Based on these facts, the Pre-
War Multinationals face an uphill battle in trying to invalidate the ac-
tions of the United States.
With regard to the interim government, the Pre-War Multinationals
fear that the United States, through its control of Iraq, will embark on
a "binge of regime-toppling" that will install governments more
friendly to the United States81 which would allow U.S. control over
the politics and subsequently, the resources and economic policies of
the world.82 They fear that U.S. control over Iraqi oil has been al-
ready set in motion since the United States established the interim
government and the United States appointed the Ministry of Oil.83
The Pre-War Multinationals, therefore, bring forth the possibility that
the interim government lacks legitimacy because it was neither de-
rived from law nor from society84 but from a U.S.-led attack, and as
such, "[it] neither has the power to issue an independent decision, or
the power to carry it out. ' 85 As a result, any cancellation of the Sad-
dam Contracts by the interim government would be invalid. In re-
sponse to this argument, one can look to the histories of the U.S.
occupations of Japan and Germany to illustrate that U.S. involvement
neither leads to regime-toppling nor illegitimate governments. After
World War II, both countries were under Allied occupation, and as a
result of U.S. influence, the "rebuilding of German democracy and the
reconstruction of postwar Japan are examples of successful institu-
tional and cultural transformations that expand the realm of the possi-
ble in democratization.18 6 But if one were to follow the analysis of
79. Greenberger & Bravin, supra note 65, at A13.
80. United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1483 (The Situation Between Iraq and Ku-
wait), 42 I.L.M. 1016 (2003).
81. Bob Davis, et al., Divisions on Rebuilding Iraq May Slow Process, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14,
2003, at A3, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3964738.
82. Jeanne Cummins, et al., Proposal's Sweep Surprises Democrats, Who May Push to Clarify
the U.S.'s Goals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2002, at A8, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3406644.
83. Pre-War Contracts, supra note 39.
84. Iraq's Governing Council Viewed as Lacking Legitimacy, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Aug.
22, 2003.
85. Id. (quoting Wisal al-Azawi, dean of political science college at al-Nahrain University).
86. Samuel H. Barnes, The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies, 95
A.J.I.L. 86, 90 (2001).
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the Pre-War Multinationals, then the subsequent governments of Ger-
many and Japan would have to be declared illegitimate, and conse-
quently, all of their actions would have to be invalidated. Not only
would it be impossible to invalidate almost six decades worth of devel-
opment and progress, but it would make no sense to do so. Further,
Germany and Japan are considered as two of the nine global powers
which make up 70% of the world's economy, are pivotal in expanding
international trade, have sophisticated militaries of their own, and are
formidable opinion leaders. 87 How could this be possible if the
United States had toppled their regimes and controlled their politics
and economies? While one can appreciate that the Pre-War Multina-
tionals just want to protect their interests, the arguments they present,
when viewed in light of the U.N. resolutions and the history of the
United States occupation of Germany and Japan, are weak.
The legitimacy debate between the United States and the Pre-War
Multinationals needs to be resolved to avoid any stalling of much
needed development of Iraq's oil industry. Because both parties have
divergent views, perhaps the only way in which to move beyond this
issue is to start focusing on the restoration of the rule of law in Iraq.
The framework of the rule of law is based on the consent of the peo-
ple governed and their equality with one another.8 8 In other words,
the rule of law provides the foundation for democracy89 because it is
grounded in the idea that people are equal. The theory behind the
rule of law is that through a democracy, a government will be elected
by its people, and because it is the people who have voted, the govern-
ment will be recognized by its voters. There will be no question of
legitimacy because legitimacy will have "derive[d] from the consent of
the governed: the people of Iraq." 90 The elected Iraqi government
can then decide what to do with the Saddam Contracts with less fear
that its decisions will be mired with doubts of legitimacy. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the democracy that evolves from the rule
of law does not simply mean holding elections. For example, Paddy
Ashdown, the high representative of Bosnia stated,
In Bosnia, we thought that democracy was the highest priority and
we measured it by the number of elections we could organize. In
87. Global Powers in Changing Times, Mar. 2003, available at http://www.ipsos-pa.com/
globalpowers/docs/IPSOSGlobalPowers72203.pdf. This is a limited syndicated quarterly report
which reports on public opinions in the U.S., Canada, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Russia and
Spain in order to monitor the stability and change in the world. Id.
88. Perito, supra note 55.
89. Id. See also El Fadl, supra note 16.
90. What Moral Legitimacy? (Editorial) WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2003, at A10, available at 2003
WL-WSJ 3964528.
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hindsight, we should have put the establishment of rule of law first,
for everything else depends on it: a functioning economy, a free and
fair political system, the development of civil society, and public
confidence in police and courts." 91
Once the rule of law is established in Iraq, with a concentration in
restoring equality and economic stability, a constitution is drafted and
ratified, and a democratic election takes place for a permanent gov-
ernment, Iraqi leaders will gain the legitimacy that is needed in order
to make and implement decisions that will affect their country and
their citizens.
B. Status of the Saddam Contracts
As previously stated in Part One, Thamir Ghadhban has cancelled
or suspended three Saddam Contracts. Russia's LUKoil contract for
the development of West Qurna and China's CNPC contract for Al-
Ahdab were two of those three, and the third has not been disclosed. 92
Mr. Ghadhban explained that all the remaining contracts would be re-
evaluated and examined and that new contracts would be an-
nounced.93 The remaining Pre-war Multinationals will just have to
wait as the interim government decides whether to respect or invali-
date their contracts. 94 It is clear that the reasoning behind these deci-
sions lies in the issue of legitimacy. Yet, in light of the arguments
presented in Section A supra, there is the possibility that the decisions
of the interim government may not be respected either. For example,
since the U.N. lifted sanctions in Iraq on May 22, 2003, LUKoil is in
negotiations with the interim government arguing that it can and will
fulfill its obligations under the West Qurna contract. 95 Additionally,
CNPC has since denied the cancellation of its contract. 96 Others have
even taken the view that when the U.N. passed the resolution to end
sanctions on Iraq, because there was no mention of the Saddam Con-
91. Perito, supra note 55.
92. Russian Contracts in Iraq: Forgive or Forget?, 8 ALEXANDER'S GAS & OIL CONNECrIONS
13 (May 28, 2003), available at http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/company/cnm32480.htm [hereinaf-
ter Russian Contracts] (explaining that Saddam had apparently cancelled LUKoil's contract al-
leging it had failed to perform under the contract. LUKoil countered that it could not perform
until the UN sanctions against Iraq would be lifted. LUKoil planned to arbitrate the issue of the
unilateral termination until the U.S. attack on Iraq put that on hold. The interim government
took the view that LUKoil's contract was already lost).
93. Iraq Halts Russian and Chinese Oil Deals, BBC NEws, May 26, 2003, available at http://
news. bbc. co. ukI2/hi/business/2937702.stm.
94. Cummins, et al., supra note 40, at A16.
95. Russian Contracts, supra note 8.
96. Pre-War Contracts, supra note 39.
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tracts, the contracts were automatically voided 97 by virtue of omission.
For example, Russia, during these U.N. negotiations, never once men-
tioned its concerns regarding the status of the Saddam Contracts and
the effect the removal of the sanctions would have on them.98 This
omission is important in light of the fact that the Pre-War Multination-
als entered into these Saddam Contracts for the purpose of being the
first to reap profits from oil once the sanctions were lifted.99 The si-
lence on the part of the Pre-War Multinationals has led some to be-
lieve that they tacitly agreed to the cancellation of the Saddam
Contracts. These differing view points illustrate that the current status
of the Saddam Contracts is, at best, uncertain.
IV. ALTERNATIVES
In spite of the diverse and opposed views on the status of the Sad-
dam Contracts, there are numerous ways in which Iraq can treat them
and manage its oil revenues. At the very least, the decisions should be
made by the permanent Iraqi government. If Iraq needs guidance
from foreign multinationals and governments, then this advice should
not be unilaterally given by any one nation. Nations as a group should
cooperate with Iraq and each other in order to ensure that the inter-
ests of one foreign nation and its multinational company are not para-
mount. It is impossible to find one solution that will please all parties.
This Section offers a two-part analysis of what can be done. Section A
presents a series of extreme alternatives in which one or two parties
can reap all the benefits of Iraq's oil. Section B concludes with a se-
ries of compromises that are beneficial to all parties, in particular to
the people of Iraq.
A. Extreme Alternatives
1. Invalidation of Saddam Contracts
One extreme alternative is the invalidation of the Saddam Con-
tracts, which, for reasons already stated above, is the least attractive
solution for the Pre-War Multinationals and most beneficial to the
United States. One could argue that invalidation does not close the
door on their involvement in Iraq's oil industry. For example, the Pre-
War Multinationals could suggest re-negotiations of the Saddam Con-
tracts with the new government. But in all fairness to the Pre-War
97. K. Hanly, Existing Iraq Oil Supply Contracts Void - Envoy, at http://www.forbes.com/mar-
kets/newswire/2003/05/22/rtr980485.html
98. Id.
99. Paul, supra note 23.
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Multinationals, why re-negotiate and risk less favorable terms when,
thanks to the Saddam Contracts, they are already "in the driver's
seat" with long-term contracts for oil fields ripe with resources? 100
Invalidation, however, is also not in the best interest of Iraq. While
declaring a contract void or rejected is a simple task, the consequences
and repercussions can be complicated. On the one hand, the Pre-War
Multinational could walk away and cut its losses, but on the other, it
could take legal action, and this is when the complication sets in.
LUKoil, for example, has threatened to arbitrate this matter in Ge-
neva.10 1 For security and to guarantee the payment of any award
against Iraq, LUKoil could attempt to impound any tankers carrying
Iraqi oil until the arbitration is settled. 10 2 The consequence of declar-
ing the LUKoil contracts void could tie up development of Iraq's oil
industry until a resolution has been reached. 0 3 While this is a reason-
able concern, there are two possible results. The first is that Iraq
could call its bluff. In other words, if LUKoil provides it with a notice
to arbitrate, Iraq could simply refuse to appear before the arbitral
panel. Iraq could risk an award against it, but that, alone, would not
give LUKoil the ability to collect on the award, whether it is a sum of
money or a demand for specific performance under the Saddam Con-
tracts. LUKoil would probably have to seek enforcement of the
award in a court in Iraq or Russia, but the national courts could
choose to cancel the award instead. Even if the award is enforced, if
Iraq chooses not to honor it, LUKoil would be forced, once again, to
go through the court systems in order to seize property and discharge
the claims asserted. This process could take years and cost a lot of
money. The second is that the arbitration could resolve the issue by
allowing the Pre-War Multinationals and the Iraqi government an op-
portunity to meet and settle on a re-negotiated contract. In spite of
this possible positive outcome, in a country devastated by years of tyr-
anny and misappropriation of wealth, reconstruction and progress
need to be immediate rather than burdened by the risk of or actual
litigation or arbitration.
100. Paul Klebnikov, I Want My Oil Field, FORBES, Oct. 27, 2003, available at http://
www.forbes.com/global/2003/1027/022-print.html.
101. Jeanne Whalen, Nations Begin Tussle Over Control of Postwar Iraq, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9,
2003, at A10, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3964280.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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2. Nationalization
Nationalization is defined as the host country's taking of property
of a foreign investor within its territories for purposes of economic or
social reform.10 4 This extreme would occur to the detriment of the
Pre-War Multinationals and the United States as the new Iraqi gov-
ernment would be in total control of its oil industry. While nationali-
zation may be viewed as a country's attempt to reclaim its sovereignty
and to protect its citizens from foreign encroachment,105 it can back-
fire and do more harm to the nation as a whole. Mexico is an excel-
lent example. Nationalization of the Mexican oil industry occurred in
1938 when President Lazaro Cardenas expropriated the oil fields in
the name of preserving and defining Mexican sovereignty.1°6 As a re-
sult, oil revenues were directed solely to Mexico, through a state-
owned company called PEMEX.10 7 While nationalization defined
Mexico as a sovereign state, it also defined the few members of society
who would profit the most.10 8 Resources were misallocated, other
sectors of the economy, such as industry and agriculture, were ignored
and there was excessive borrowing allowed by the growth in oil
reserves. 10 9 Eventually, Mexico was faced with a $100 billion debt, a
devaluation of the peso, and an oil industry that fell behind de-
mand. 110 Mexico was then forced to abandon nationalization and
move towards a policy of restructuring and privatization in order to
survive and attract foreign investment.1 ' Although the goal to be-
come an independent, self-sufficient and wealthy nation is commenda-
ble, Mexico has shown that nationalization is not the means to achieve
or sustain it.
If Iraq needs another example, it needs to look no further than its
own country and the Nationalization Acts of 1972-74. As already
mentioned earlier, when the oil industry was nationalized, all the
wealth of the Iraqis was diverted to those in power. Nationalization
did not serve to strengthen Iraq as a sovereign nation or enrich the
Iraqi people. Instead, it created "rancorous relations between the
[oil] companies and the [Iraqi] government, rocked the international
104. Greta Gainer, Nationalization: The Dichotomy Between Western and Third World Per-
spectives in International Law, 26 How. L.J. 1547, 1548 (1983).
105. Kenneth D. Jensen, Chapapote: Interdependence and the Liberalization of the Oil Indus-
try in Mexico, 24 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 81 (1993).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 88.
108. Id. at 89.
109. Id. at 96.
110. Id. at 96.
111. Jensen, supra note 105, at 103-104.
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oil industry,"' n 2 and deprived the Iraqis of their property. The oil
worth produced in Iraq since 1968 totals approximately $580 billion in
revenue, yet the country remains poor due to Saddam Hussein's pil-
laging, squandering, and dissipation of Iraq's oil resources.113 With
Saddam Hussein no longer in power, nationalization may not result in
the same gross misappropriation of wealth. However, there is no
guarantee that the same situation will not resurface once a permanent
government is in place because nationalization means control of the
nation's wealth in the hands of only those in power. In essence, na-
tionalization would not serve to benefit any of the parties involved.
3. Privatization and Economic Reform
Privatization will be addressed in this subsection because it is the
extreme opposite of nationalization. Economic reform is the first step
towards rebuilding Iraq with a strong foundation for democracy to
flourish.1 14 The reasoning is that a guarantee of economic well-being
and fair and equal distribution of wealth guard against poverty and
tyranny.11 5 Germany pre-World War II illustrates this theory.1 16
Throughout Adolf Hitler's rule, there was neither economic protec-
tion of public or personal property nor promotion of individual eco-
nomic liberty.117 Through legislative manipulation, Hitler was legally
able to constrain economic freedom, confiscate private property, na-
tionalize industries, and consolidate his power in order to create a to-
talitarian regime 18 through which he maintained and strengthened his
control. Had Hitler focused instead on economic reform in which
property was protected and wealth evenly distributed, Germany's his-
tory would have been different. The same holds true for Iraq. Sad-
dam Hussein controlled the country's wealth through which he
augmented and secured his own power. Economic reform through
privatization of Iraq's oil industry would have redistributed this
wealth. Now that Saddam Hussein is no longer in power, Iraq can
begin to privatize.
112. Paul, supra note 23.
113. Drollas, supra note 28.
114. Austin Bay, Garner's Media Woes: When Will They Learn, Apr. 23, 2003 at http://
www.strategypage.com/iraqwardiary/articles/20030423.asp; Paul Beard II, It's the Iraqi Economy,
Stupid! CAPITALISM MAG., May 2, 2003, available at http:#/capmag.com/articlePrintasp?ID=
2751.
115. Bay, supra note 114; Beard, supra note 114.
116. Bay, supra note 114; Beard, supra note 114.
117. Bay, supra note 114; Beard, supra note 114.
118. Beard, supra note 114.
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Privatization of the oil industry as a means in which economic free-
dom and equality can be promoted in Iraq is illustrated by the success
of privatization in Latin America, specifically in Argentina, Colombia
and Peru. In the 1990's Latin America underwent a series of eco-
nomic reforms which began with the privatization of state-owned oil
industry because it was seen as the largest opportunity to raise reve-
nue. 119 Privatization of Argentina's Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales
(YPF) was complete in 1993.120 YPF's privatization has since been
credited for the reversal of years of declining oil production, an influx
of foreign direct investment, and a turnaround of the oil industry
through new sources of substantial investment and technology. 12' Co-
lombia's efforts to privatize have also led to foreign investments that
will allow Columbia to upgrade its pipelines and to increase its explo-
rations and drilling of oil fields. 122 Additionally, privatization has led
to the discovery of two billion barrels of reserves in Columbia's oil
fields. 123 The privatization of Peru's Petroperu will raise $3 billion for
the country.1 24 Privatization brought foreign investment of capital,
expertise, and technology which culminated in discoveries of more
natural resources and opportunities of wealth for Latin America and
its citizens. Iraq, on the other hand, is suffering from a run-down oil
industry crippled by years of U.N. sanctions that prevented importa-
tion of technology and capital essential for maximizing its oil produc-
tion.125 Through privatization, however, Iraq can import the help it
needs to develop its natural resources, as Latin America has done.
Privatization will also keep the oil revenues away from control of only
the government and those in power, thereby ensuring that history, as
in Germany and Iraq, will not repeat itself.
4. U.S. Billion Dollar Aid to Iraq
On October 17, 2003, Congress voted in favor of President Bush's
request for $87 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan, 26 of which $20 bil-
119. Privatization and the Globalization of Energy Markets at http://www.itcilo.itlenglish/ac-
trav/telearn/global/ilo/frame/energyla.htm and http://www.fedstats.gov.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Jeff Gerth, Report Offered Bleak Outlook About Iraq Oil, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 2003, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/O5/international/middleeastl05OL.html.
126. David Firestone, Lawmakers Back Request by Bush on Funds for Iraq, N.Y. Times, Oct.
18, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/1O/18/international/middleeast/18COST.html.
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lion would be for the rebuilding of Iraq.12 7 The Senate voted that $10
billion of this money would be a loan and repaid through future oil
revenues. 128 Although this is a generous offer on behalf of the United
States, this creates a number of problems. Does this mean that the
United States has a lien on all of the oil revenues until this loan is
repaid? Can the United States use this loan as leverage for gaining
additional reconstruction contracts in Iraq? Can the United States
use this loan to ensure that its interests are protected at the expense of
other nations and the Iraqi people? In light of all the necessary devel-
opment and reconstruction needed in Iraq, can the United States even
expect to get all if its money back? When a Pre-War multinational
enters into another contract for oil development and exploration, how
much of the revenues will go to the United States and how little will
the Iraqi people get? Who will be responsible for the accounting and
how can Iraq ensure that the accounting is adequate and precise? The
leverage the United States will have could create a situation analo-
gous to that of Saddam Hussein's regime in that the wealth of the
Iraqi people will be allocated to the U.S. government instead of to the
people of Iraq. Foreign investment will decrease as multinationals will
not invest in a nation whose profits are going to a third party. With-
out foreign investment, a nation wishing to develop and modernize
will not be able to do so, 129 and the Iraqi people, once again, will suf-
fer economically as they did under Saddam Hussein.
5. Executive Order 13303
President Bush signed Executive Order 13303, Protecting the De-
velopment Funds for Iraq and Certain Other Property in Which Iraq
Has an Interest, on May 22, 2003.130 The pertinent part of this Order
is Section 1(b) which states that any judicial process or judgment is
prohibited with respect to:
all Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products, and interests therein,
and proceeds, obligations, or any financial instruments of any na-
ture whatsoever arising from or related to the sale or marketing
thereof, and interests therein, in which any foreign country or a na-
tional thereof has any interest, that are in the United States, that
127. Funds for Iraq (Editorial), DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 18, 2003, available at http://
www.freep.com/voices/editorials/eiraql8_20031018.htm.
128. Firestone, supra note 126.
129. Amy Waldman, Despite Widespread Poverty, a Consumer Class Emerges in India, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/20/intemational/asia/20INDI.
html (which describes how foreign investment, specifically $5 billion in 2003, has turned the
Indian economy into the second fastest growing economy in the world, after China).
130. Rick Kelly, Bush Grants Legal Immunity to US Corporations Looting Iraqi Oil, Aug. 19,
2003 at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/aug2003/preo-a19-prn.shtml.
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hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter
come within the possession or control of the United States
persons. 131
This basically means that any U.S. oil company in Iraq is shielded
from any liability that may arise from any connection with Iraq's oil,
from breach of contract, from any damages from oil spills, from any
labor rights violations, and even from payment of taxes owed to
Iraq.132 While the Bush Administration claims that this fund is only to
protect the oil industry on behalf of the Iraqi people, the language of
EO 13303 is clear in shielding U.S.-based corporations from any civil
or criminal liability in the United States post-Saddam Hussein.133
Tom Devine, legal director for the non-profit legal firm, Government
Accountability Project, describes this as a "blank check for corporate
anarchy [as it] cancels the concept of corporate accountability and
abandons the rule of law."' 134 This statement illustrates the fear that
this Executive Order serves to benefit only American multinational
businesses at the expense of Iraq and its citizens.
As a counter-argument, however, one needs to look at the Execu-
tive Order in its entirety. The goal is to protect Iraqi oil from attach-
ment, threat of attachment, or other judicial process in order to ensure
the reconstruction and restoration of Iraq, the maintenance of peace
and security in Iraq, and the development of Iraq's infrastructure and
institutions are achieved.1 35 In light of these objectives, the Executive
Order might not be so threatening. Further, there is debate as to
whether a federal executive act could prevail, or supercede, interna-
tional law.' 36 There are also allegations that the Presidents of the
United States have increased their powers by ruling and legislating
through legislative order.' 37 Further analysis into these topics is out of
the scope of this paper, however, these concerns at least illustrate that
executive orders may not be always accepted with open arms.
6. Service Contract
The service contract is considered as extreme in terms of the dam-
age ultimately suffered by Iraq, because of the contract's profit-shar-
131. Exec. Order No. 13303, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,931 (May 28, 2003).
132. Kelly, supra note 130.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Exec. Order No. 13303, supra note 131.
136. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., May the President Violate Customary International Law?: Federal
Statutes, Executive Orders and "Self-Executing Custom", 81 A.J.I.L. (1987).
137. William J. Olson & Alan Woll, Executive Orders and National Emergencies, How Presi-
dents Have Come to "Run the Country" by Usurping Legislative Power, 358 POLICY ANALYSIS,
Oct. 28, 1999.
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ing structure. The service contract is an agreement between a foreign
company and the host country in which the former agrees to provide
services and information for the development of the oil resources in
exchange for a fee or a share of the production. 138 There are three
types of service contracts: the pure service contract, the technical as-
sistance agreement, and the risk service contract, 139 but for purposes
of this section, only the pure service contract will be discussed. The
pure service contract requires the foreign company to perform a speci-
fied service for a specified flat fee.1 40 While this is straightforward and
simple, it is unattractive to multinational corporations because they
provide no right to production or sharing of the profits.1 41 More im-
portantly, it is not advantageous to the Iraqis in relation to the issue of
foreign investment. Foreign investment can bring into Iraq "needed
capital, skills, and know-how, either producing goods needed for the
domestic market or contributing new exports. '142 Companies are in
business to maximize shareholder wealth. If they cannot profit from
their contracts with Iraq, their fiduciary duties to their shareholders
will require that they invest their capital, expertise and technology
elsewhere, and Iraq will not develop to its fullest potential. Iraq
should avoid entering into service contracts with regard to its oil in-
dustry to ensure that it remains attractive to foreign investors.
138. Ernest E. Smith & John S. Dzienkowski, A Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petroleum
Arrangements, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 13, 40 (1989) (citing R. MIKESELL, PETROLEUM COMPANY
OPERATIONS AND AGREEMENTS IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 21 (1984)).
139. Id. at 40. The technical assistance agreement is almost identical to the pure service con-
tract, except that the foreign company agrees to provide the host country with technical assis-
tance such as training in and providing equipment for the exploration, development and
production of oil. Id. at 40-41. The foreign company receives a flat fee, but it also receives
reimbursement for any expenses incurred as well as a fee based on a certain level of production.
Id. at 41. Under the risk service contract, the foreign company explores a specified area in order
to evaluate its potential for production. Id. at 41. It does so by using its own capital and with
understanding that if nothing is discovered, it receives no payment. Id. at 41 (citing R. MIKE-
SELL, PETROLEUM COMPANY OPERATIONS AND AGREEMENTS IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
21 (1984)). Only once there is actual production is the foreign company reimbursed for its ex-
ploration expenses. Id. at 41. Additionally, the foreign company never obtains any rights to this
specified area. Id. at 41.
140. Id. at 40.
141. Id. at 40 (citing BARROWS, INTERNATIONAL TRENDS AND LATEST CHANGES IN OIL
LAWS, CONCESSION, AND PRODUCTION-SHARING AGREEMENTS WORLDWIDE, 1983 INST. ON
INT'L OIL & GAS L. at A-1, A-14).
142. John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, Chapter 2 from LATIN
AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH HAS HAPPENED? (1990), available at http://www.iie.com/
publications/papers/williamsonll02-2.htm.
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7. Law of Occupation
While the Law of Occupation is not necessarily an alternative as the
United States' is already occupying Iraq, it needs to be addressed as
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, stated that the United States,
whatever its actions, would act "consistent with international law with
respect to the responsibilities of an occupying power." 143 The Law of
Occupation, which applies when a foreign military is in force in a
country without that country's consent,144 provides the United States
with certain rights and obligations within and towards Iraq. Pursuant
to Article 43 of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all measures in his power
to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety,
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in
the country.
In other words, while the occupying power has the authority to do
what is necessary to preserve order, it must maintain and respect ex-
isting laws and regulations. 145 Only in the event that preservation of
existing laws is impossible or harms the safety and development of the
occupant, can the occupying power consider repealing old laws and
enacting new legislation. 146 In light of this exception, the United
States can choose to invalidate the Saddam Contracts in the name of
exterminating any reminder of Saddam Hussein, take over the oil
fields and develop the fields themselves. The Law of Occupation,
however, requires that the acts of the occupier must be solely for the
benefit of the occupied population's benefit. 147 This Law, therefore,
serves a triple purpose. It assuages the Pre-War Multinationals that
the United States can only channel the oil revenues to meet the Iraqis'
needs,148 and that it cannot use any oil revenues for its direct benefit
without being in breach of the Hague Convention.149 It prevents the
United States from claiming control over "the undetermined rights of
143. Chip Cummins, International Law Gives Occupying Power Freedom to Maneuver, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 29, 2003, at A16.
144. Perito, supra note 55.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Suzanne Nossel, Winning the Postwar, 2003-JUN Legal Aff. 18.
148. Id.
149. Henry J. Richardson, III, U.S. Hegemony, Race and Oil in Deciding United Nations Se-
curity Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq, 17 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 27, 70 (2003). This article
also uses Japan's conquest of Singapore in World War II as an example of the Law of Occupa-
tion. Japan's use and removal of Singapore's oil for its own purpose and without compensation
to Singapore amounted to illegal plunder. Id.
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foreign contractors, joint venturers and concessionaries."1 50 And
most importantly, it ensures that the Iraqis will be the beneficiaries of
their oil and its revenue.
B. Compromises
The Pre-war Multinationals would prefer the retention and enforce-
ment of the Saddam Contracts because their investments would re-
main unchanged. The benefits of contract sanctity, however, are not
unique to the Pre-war Multinationals, as the Iraqis' best interest will
be served as well. Contract sanctity would deter any damage to the
investment climate of the oil industry worldwide, it would allay any
fears that the United States will encourage invalidation in order to
place its multinational corporations in better standing for future oil
contracts in Iraq, 51 and as stated earlier, it would prevent arbitration
or litigation from hindering any development. Regardless, it is clear
that contract sanctity is not a viable option in light of the statements of
Thadmir Gadhban, the U.N.'s authorization of a U.S.-led multina-
tional force in the restructuring and rebuilding of Iraq,152 and the fact
that a panel of Iraqi oil experts, sponsored by the U.S. State Depart-
ment, has recommended that every contract relating to oil in Iraq
should be reviewed on a "case-by-case basis. '' 153 Each nation will
want what is best for its corporations, and rather than having one win-
ner, there are compromises to which all parties can be amenable for
mutual benefit. Compromising would steer the Pre-war Multinationals
away from legal proceedings and the questions of legitimacy would no
longer need to be debated. The focus then could be solely on the
rebuilding and development of Iraq.
What Iraq needs is to have a lot of companies doing business in
Iraq.154 Private-sector companies, as history has shown, have been the
150. International Law Would Rule Post-War Iraqi Oil Production, 8 ALEXANDER'S GAS &
OIL CONNECTIONS 3 (2003) available at http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/company/cnm30628.htm
(quoting R. Dobie Langenkamp, professor of law and director of the National Energy-Environ-
ment Law & Policy Institute at the University of Tulsa).
151. Michael Lelyveld, Iraq: Are Baghdad's Old Oil Contracts Valid? RADIO FREE EUROPE/
RADIO LIBERTY, Apr. 16, 2003, available at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/04/
16042003161849.asp.
152. Felicity Barringer, Unanimous Vote by U.N.'s Council Adopts Iraq Plan, N. Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/17/international/middleeast/17NATI.
html.
153. Chip Cummins, Expatriate Iraqis Say Oil Fields Should Be Opened, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3,
2003, at A15, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3960697 (quoting Muhammad-Ali Zainy, economist for
the London-based Center for Global Energy Studies).
154. John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, The Company Way, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2003,
at A12, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3964326.
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catalyst for economic growth in the West, as small family partnerships
and state-approved monopolies gave way to independent companies
that "drove the first great age of globalization. ' 155 Multinational com-
panies like to make money, and Iraq's oil fields provide fertile ground
for investments. Compromising on what happens with the Saddam
Contracts is the first step in creating a symbiotic relationship between
Iraq and multinational companies. The compromises, however, are
subject to two conditions precedent. Condition number one is invali-
dating the Saddam Contracts and starting over with a clean slate.
Condition number two is to open all the oil contracts to bidding, at the
same time, to all multinational corporations interested in doing busi-
ness with Iraq.
1. Afghanistan as a Model
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the war on terrorism
turned the world's attention to Afghanistan. After decades of war
and conflict, the United Nations brokered talks in Bonn, Germany,
for the rebuilding and restructuring of Afghanistan. 156 Through these
meetings, it was decided that there would first be a six-month interim
administration established in Afghanistan, followed by a two-year
transitional administration, and finally, a permanent government
elected nationally.157 All of this would be done through the auspices
of the United Nations. It would be an international approach rather
than a unilateral approach through which one nation could secure a
favorable position through protective and independent involvement in
the creation of a permanent government. If Iraq would follow this
model, Iraq would have a timeline in which to establish itself as an
independent and recognized democracy with which multinational cor-
porations worldwide will have security and faith in investing and do-
ing business.
2. Establishment of a "Steering Committee"
Members of the private sector of the economy need to lend their
business, financial, and intellectual expertise in the rebuilding of Iraq
because the revival of its economy will depend on foreign investment,
155. Id. This article also explains the necessity of companies to separate the oil industry from
state control to ensure that not just an elite few will benefit from oil revenues. Id. Ms. Wool-
dridge cites to joint companies as a means to ensure economic benefit for all citizens of a nation,
and quotes Peter Drucker who states that the joint-stock company was "the first autonomous
institution in hundreds of years, the first to create a power center that was within society yet
independent of the central government of the nation state." Id.
156. Ossai Miazad, Transnational Justice in Post-war Afghanistan, 9 HUM. RTS. BR. 2 (2002).
157. Id. at 2.
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project development, and job creation. 158 These jobs and projects can
be created and implemented once a stable and attractive investment
climate is established in Iraq, and this environment can be achieved by
implementing policies that ensure transparency, legal recourse, sound
corporate governance, and liberal foreign trade policies. 159 Iraq can
be guided and educated in implementing and creating these policies
through a "steering committee" comprised of business leaders.160 The
business leaders would come from all over the world to ensure that
Iraq would receive well-rounded and diverse expertise. This steering
committee would then accelerate, supervise, and monitor the execu-
tion of these policies, as well as oversee the reform necessary in post-
Saddam Iraq.' 61 Once these measures to eliminate and prevent cor-
ruption are adopted, foreign multinational corporations will feel se-
cure in investing and doing business in Iraq, and with this influx of
investment, jobs will be created, poverty will decline, the quality of
life for the Iraqis will improve, and stability will be rooted. 162 Iraq will
become a healthy and rich nation.
3. Modern Concession
The modern concession grants a company "the exclusive rights to
explore, search, and drill for, produce, store, transport, and sell Petro-
leum"'163 during a specified number of years and in a specified area.164
This type of contract requires that the company holding the conces-
sion follow a development schedule and a work program.165 Once the
specified time period lapses, the company then relinquishes that part
of the oil field it was working on. 166 It also allows for bonus payments
to the company if certain levels of production are met or exceeded,
and it allows for royalties and rental payments to the host country
based on performance. 167 The host country has the choice of receiv-
158. Privatization and the Globalization of Energy Markets, supra note 119.
159. Robert McFarlane & Michael Bleyzer, Taking Iraq Private, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2003, at
A10.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 138 (quoting Abu Dhabi Specimen Draft Oil Conces-
sion Agreement, art. 34, reprinted in K. BLINN, C. DUVAL, H. LE LEUCH & A. PERTUZIO, IN-
TERNATIONAL PETROLEUM & EXPLOITATION AGREEMENTS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, & POLICY
ASPECTS 33-42 (1986)).
164. Id. at 36.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 37.
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ing these payments in cash or in kind, 168 which allows the company
some flexibility with its capital. Finally, the company agrees to pay
the host country a specified amount for tax on its income earned
through this concession, 169 thereby ensuring that the host country can
increase its revenue proportionately with the increase in production of
its resources. The modern concession is attractive to both multina-
tional corporations as well as to the host country. Applied in Iraq, the
modern concession will provide continuous benefits to the multina-
tionals and the Iraqi people. When companies invest in Iraq, capital
enters Iraq. With capital, Iraq can offer incentive bonuses to compa-
nies that exceed levels of production, and higher levels of production
lead to higher royalties and taxes paid to Iraq. The win-win result is
clear: companies are happy because they are profiting and the Iraqi
people are happy because their country is being developed.
4. Production-Sharing Agreement
This agreement will require the establishment of a state oil com-
pany.170 It is an agreement which grants a foreign company the right
to explore and develop an area, and in turn, the state oil company
recovers its costs and a specified amount as profit.171 Indonesia has
used this type of agreement since the 1960's.172 Petramina, Indone-
sia's state oil company, usually enters into this agreement with a for-
eign company for thirty years.173 The foreign company is required to
establish a work program which must be first approved by Pe-
tramina.174 Once approved, the foreign company pays Petramina a
management fee to supervise and facilitate this work program.175 As
compensation, the foreign company deducts its operating costs from
the gross production, and the remainder of the production is then di-
vided 65%-35% between Petramina and the foreign company, respec-
tively. 176 Like the modern concession, the foreign company must also
168. Id. at 37.
169. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 138, at 37.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 37-38.
172. Id. at 38 (citing R. MIKESELL, PETROLEUM COMPANY OPERATIONS AND AGREEMENTS IN
THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 21 (1984)).
173. Id. (citing Model Production Sharing Contract Between Petramina and Private Compa-
nies, reprinted in K. BLINN, C. DUVAL, H. LE LEUCH & A. PERTUzIo, INTERNATIONAL PETRO-
LEUM & EXPLOITATION AGREEMENTS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLICY ASPECTS, app. at 2.7
(1986)).
174. Id.
175. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 138, at 38.
176. Id.
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pay taxes on income earned to Indonesia.177 This agreement is attrac-
tive to host countries because of its ability to control the manner of
the work performed through the approval process. 178 Although the
profits of a foreign company are limited to 35%, the risk that an area
of land is unproductive is mostly borne by the host country. In Pe-
tramina's situation, if land is unproductive, it receives nothing. 179 For
Iraqis, this arrangement would bring in the technology needed for ex-
ploration and development of its oil fields, as well as the capital neces-
sary to rebuild Iraq.
5. Participation Agreement
Participation agreements are developed through compromise be-
tween foreign companies and host countries of the Middle East.180
These agreements require that the foreign company and the state oil
company or host country merge to create a joint operating company
for development and exploration of the oil fields. 181 The foreign com-
pany then provides the expertise and technology as well as capital to
the joint company while the other party contributes the land. 82 The
joint company will be managed by representatives of both parties, and
the ownership is usually equal, though the host country or state oil
company may negotiate to have a 1% advantage over the foreign
company. 183 There is little risk to both parties as this agreement is
rarely entered into prior to assessing whether an oil field will be pro-
ductive or not.18 4 In other words, a foreign company is usually already
developing and exploring an oil field through another type of contract,
and once the field is producing and developed, both parties can rene-
gotiate to form this joint operating company. Multinational corpora-
tions and Iraqis will benefit as both parties manage the oil fields, both
manage the revenues, and both share equally in the expenses and
profits. This is a relationship in which both parties complement one
another through cooperation.
6. Trust Fund
A trust is defined as "a legally recognized and enforceable arrange-
ment ... whereby one or more persons (trustees) take title to prop-
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 38.
180. Id. at 39.
181. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 138, at 39.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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erty in order to protect or conserve it for one or more beneficiaries of
the entity.118 5 Iraq oil belongs to the people of Iraq. One way to give
this oil back to the Iraqis, while ensuring that each Iraqi receives his/
her proportionate share, is to create an oil investment trust, and then
distribute the oil proceeds through dividends. 18 6 An example of this
system is Alaska's Permanent Fund.1 87 The 1959 Constitution of the
State of Alaska stipulates that the natural resources of Alaska belong
to the residents of Alaska.1 88 In 1969, Alaska auctioned off drilling
rights to Prudhoe Bay in the form of leases, thereby netting $900 mil-
lion.189 In 1976, the residents of Alaska voted to approve the creation
of the Alaska Permanent Fund savings trust as a means to ensure that
these oil revenues would not run out in the future. 90 Twenty-five per-
cent of all revenue from natural resources is deposited into this trust,
and each year, every Alaska resident is entitled to a dividend pay-
ment. 91 Meanwhile, the principal of the trust is invested and cannot
be spent without the majority vote of the people.' 92 To date, this trust
is worth approximately $23 billion.193
While this system has worked in Alaska, Iraq is a different situation.
It has been subjected to a dictatorial regime for over thirty years
throughout which the oil revenues have been either squandered by or
diverted to those in power. Additionally, while Alaska had a constitu-
tion already in place, Iraq's interim government is still in the process
of rewriting its constitution.1 94 Finally, it would take years to develop
the trust fund with revenues from Iraqi oil, and there is the legitimate
fear of the state being in control of Iraqi oil once again. 195 One solu-
tion to these concerns would be to present each Iraqi citizen with a
voucher, whose minimum price is guaranteed by the Central Bank of
Iraq, which could be traded in for dividends once the trust is devel-
oped. 196 Iraqis would have the choice of holding on to the vouchers or
selling them to either foreign businesses or other Iraqis, and using
185. WARREN GORHAM & LAMONT TAX DICTIONARY 820 (Westin ed. 2002).
186. Drollas, supra note 28.
187. Id.
188. AK Const. art. VIII, § 2.
189. Alaska, Revenue, Permanent Fund Dividend Division Organization at http://
www.pfd.state.ak.us/OVERVIEW.HTM.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Drollas, supra note 28.
194. Barringer, supra note 152.
195. Drollas, supra note 28.
196. Id.
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these proceeds however they wish. 197 The oil industry would not suf-
fer regardless of what the Iraqis decide to do with their vouchers
based on the following reasoning: if the Iraqis choose to hold on to the
vouchers, then those managing Iraqi oil will be responsible for and
accountable to the holders. 198 On the other hand, if the Iraqis sell
them to foreign companies, the oil industry would run efficiently in
order to protect the interests of these investors, and the country would
receive its proportionate share of revenues through taxes, job crea-
tion, and further foreign direct investment. 199 While it may take years
to accumulate wealth, the trust, if run by the Iraqis, can serve as secur-
ity for future wealth, and it can guarantee that each Iraqi citizen will
own and control his/her proportionate share of oil.
7. Trade-Offs
The Pre-War Multinationals want their interests protected through
enforcement of the Saddam Contracts. The United States wants "a
piece of the pie" or an appropriate share of the oil industry through
invalidating them. The Iraqis want what is rightfully theirs. To benefit
all three parties, a trade-off system could be implemented. 200 In other
words, in exchange for supporting the United States in its attack and
occupation of Iraq, the Pre-war Multinationals would gain access to
Iraqi oil.201 This access would be guaranteed by the United States, as
the occupying force in Iraq. The U.S. would no longer be victim to
diplomatic isolation as the U.S.-led coalition would have the support
of the other nations of the United Nations,20 2 and the Pre-war Mul-
tinationals, in turn, would not be shut out of oil profits by U.S. compa-
nies. The people of Iraq will not have its oil industry tangled in legal
proceedings, they will receive the technology and expertise needed to
expand their oil industry, and they can begin to collect on the reve-
nues produced by investments made by companies worldwide. The
one danger is that there is no guarantee that the permanent govern-
ment of Iraq would honor trade-offs made by the United States20 3 at
this point in time. Aside from this potential risk, the trade-off would
serve as an immediate, albeit short term, solution to the debate over
the status of the Saddam Contracts.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Richardson, supra note 149, at 74.
201. Id. at 74.
202. Barringer, supra note 152.
203. Richardson, supra note 149, at 74.
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8. Insurance
Multinational corporations, regardless of how powerful or rich, take
risks every time they do business abroad. These risks are not just eco-
nomic.2 04 There are political risks as well, as countries with which
these corporations do business may experience government instabil-
ity, terrorist activities, blockage of currency, and expropriations. 2 5 A
common phenomenon is what political economist, Raymond Vernon,
described as "the vulnerability of firms with large fixed investments to
find the terms of their operating agreements changed, or renegotiated,
once their operations are in place and have proved successful. a2 0 6
This is what Pre-war Multinationals are experiencing now - their con-
tracts may or may not be repudiated or breached by the interim Iraqi
government. The way to deal with this political risk is to transfer it
through the use of insurance.207 Host countries can also provide in-
surance to foreign investors. For example, the Iranian government
urged approval of legislation that would protect investments in Iran's
Free Trade Zones, such as the Gulf islands of Kish and Qeshm and the
southeastern port of Shabahar on the Oman Sea.20 8 It also would pro-
tect against any losses if another revolution or expropriation oc-
curred.20 9 While the types of coverage are limited, and the cost of the
premiums is high and the applications and legal arrangements are
complex210 for political risk insurance, it is a means through which
foreign investment can be attracted. The Pre-war Multinationals, the
United States, and Iraq should work together to promote political risk
insurance and to find additional sources to provide coverage.
204. See Symposium, Energy and International Law: Development, Litigation and Regulation,
36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 54 (2001).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 88 (quoting RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL
SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES (1971)).
207. Id. at 56. The Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency (MIGA), a branch of the World
Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), owned by the United States gov-
ernment, and other private insurance companies, such as Zurich or the American International
Group, offer this type of political risk insurance. See http://www.miga.org. MIGA offers cover-
age for transfer restrictions, which is protection against losses from inability to convert local
currency, expropriation, breach of contract and war, and civil disturbance. Id. OPIC offers cov-
erage only for inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence. See http://www.opic.org.
208. Iran Woos Foreigners to Invest in Free-Trade Zones, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Oct. 28, 1998,
available at 1998 WL 16627928. See also George F. Salamy, A New Era of Economic Growth in
Iran: Application of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Opinions to Bilateral Investments with
Iran, 12 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 283, 313 (1999).
209. Salamy, supra note 208.
210. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 138, at 40-41.
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V. MORE ALTERNATIVES
In light of the spirit of compromise of the Pre-War Multinationals
and the United States, a quick and efficient resolution to the status of
the Saddam Contracts is possible. Unfortunately, Iraq's foreign debt
is estimated to be at least $350 billion, and there are questions con-
cerning Iraq's ability to repay this amount.211 This debt will have an
impact on Iraq's oil industry as this natural resource may be the only
means by which the debt can be repaid. For example, as the largest
holders of Iraqi debt,212 Russia and France hoped to capitalize on
Iraq's oil fields in order to recover its debts, especially once the U.N.
sanctions were lifted.213 Iraq's other creditors214 may attempt to at-
tach oil proceeds for repayment. Regardless of how the Saddam Con-
tracts will be treated, this debt will need to be addressed and resolved
in order to permit Iraq to develop into a wealthy, independent nation.
If the post-Saddam Iraq assumes this debt outright, it would cripple
itself economically. 215 With all these considerations in mind, the Pre-
war Multinationals offer three alternatives: the Doctrine of Odious
Debt, bilateral negotiations and the intervention of the Paris Club.
A. The Doctrine of Odious Debt
This doctrine originated in 1898 with the Spanish-America War in
which the United States cancelled Cuba's Spanish debts on the
grounds that Spain incurred the debts for reasons contrary to the best
interests of the Cubans and that the Cubans did not consent.21 6 Alex-
ander Sack, explained:
[I]f a despotic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the inter-
est of the state, but to strengthen its despotic regime ... this debt is
odious .... This debt is not an obligation for the nation; it is a
regime's debt, a personal debt of the power that has incurred it,
consequently it falls with the fall of this power.217
211. Reconstructing Iraq: Those Odious Debts, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2003, at 13. This article
explains that South Korea is owed in excess of $10 billion and the debt and war reparations owed
to lenders, commercial banks, and other governments is estimated to be $350 billion. Id.
212. Solomon, supra note 49 (explaining that Russia's debts were incurred from Soviet-ear
military sales, and France was Iraq's most important arms supplier).
213. Id.
214. Jay Solomon, et al., The Assault on Iraq: Iraq's Creditors Hope to Collect, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 26, 2003, at A8, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3962993 (explaining that South Korea's Hyundai
Engineering & Construction Co. is one creditor owed $4 billion for infrastructure projects). See
also Bob Davis et al., Divisions on Rebuilding Iraq May Slow Process, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14,
2003, at A3, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3964738 (stating that Germany and Kuwait are additional
creditors).
215. Reconstructing Iraq: Those Odious Debts, supra note 211.
216. Solomon, supra note 49.
217. SACK, supra note 44.
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While this doctrine exists and offers a beneficial resolution to the
Iraqis, there are traps that exist in applying this Doctrine. This Doc-
trine has not been used often,218 and it is not an established interna-
tional principle. 2t 9 Further, there are concerns surrounding who will
classify which debts as odious and which debts as legitimate, as well as
how there can be assurances as to the truthfulness of the classifica-
tion.220 For example, if the institution charged with the classification
is sympathetic to the plight of developing nations, it could randomly
declare a debt as odious in order to keep the poor country from pay-
ing it.221 Additionally, debt forgiveness could start "a bad precedent,
casting doubt over lending to all sorts of countries ... that might one
day transition to a better, democratic regime. '222
The United States, however, has advocated and applied this Doc-
trine. On June 16, 2003, Congress passed the Iraqi Freedom From
Debt Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") "to call for the cancel-
lation of loans made to Iraq by multilateral financial institutions. '223
In Section 2 of this Act, Congress reasoned that debt cancellation is
"an essential tool" as well as "an effective development tool" for re-
building a nation and addressing humanitarian needs of a country dev-
astated by war and bad leadership. 224 It further reasoned that these
loans were incurred to benefit the Baath party and Saddam Hussein
through "lavish palaces, secret police, prisons and illegal weapons pro-
grams" rather than for the benefit of the Iraqis, 225 thereby proving
that Iraq's debt is truly odious as it did not benefit the people of Iraq.
Section 2(3) of the Act explains:
According to international precedent, debts incurred by dictator-
ships for the purposes of oppressing their people or for personal
purpose may be considered 'odious'. In cases where borrowed
money is used in ways contrary to the people's interest, with the
knowledge of the creditors, the creditors may be said to have com-
mitted a hostile act against the people. Under such reasoning, such
debts may be questioned. 226
218. Solomon, supra note 49 (explaining that this Doctrine was applied after the Russian
Revolution in 1917 and may be applied to South Africa's apartheid-era debts).
219. Id.
220. Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 48, available at http://www.imf.orglexternalpubslft/
fandd/2002/O6fkremer.htm.
221. Id.
222. Those Odious Debts: Should Those Who Lent to Saddam Get their Money Back?, ECONO-
MIST, Oct. 18, 2003, at 13.
223. Iraqi Freedom From Debt Act: House Bill, H.R. 2482, 108th Cong. (2003), available at
http://www.fcnl.orglissues/item.php?item-id=39&issueid=35.
224. Id. § 2(1).
225. Id. § 2(2).
226. Id. § 2(3).
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Congress then cited Cuba as the first example of odious debt cancella-
tion when the United States took it over from Spain in 1898.227 As
per Congress, this Act "would remove a major impediment to poverty
reduction and economic growth in Iraq, enable Iraq to invest its re-
sources in health care, education, and poverty reduction, and give Iraq
a fresh start in the post-war period. '228 This Act is to serve as a prece-
dent for all other debt holders to either cancel or greatly reduce its
debts owed by Iraq.229 While this is a gracious and generous offer on
behalf of the United States, the fact remains that Russia and France
are the largest debt holders in Iraq, and the United States has no Iraqi
debt.230  In order to get France and Russia on board, they need to
realize that Iraq is a unique case unlikely to set any sort of precedent
due to its exceptional circumstances. 231 The facts are that a regime
change finally occurred after twelve years of U.N. economic sanctions
and that the people of Iraq have been mired in poverty.232 With Sad-
dam Hussein gone, Iraq has a chance to reclaim its wealth, and the
best way to promote this is through debt forgiveness.233
B. Bilateral Negotiations
To avoid any surprises or ill-will to the nations holding these debts,
another solution to debt resolution would be through bilateral negoti-
ations. While this is no guarantee that the debtor-nations will retrieve
all they are owed, it is an equitable solution, as only those parties with
a stake are involved. The permanent government could establish a
creditors committee, 234 and through negotiations, these nations may
be able to get partial compensation, especially through reconstruction
business, a transfer of crude oil and future oil contracts, and business
in Iraq.2 35 This will also prevent any lawsuits filed against Iraq that
would hold up any reconstruction or development of the nation.2 36
227. Id. § 2(4).
228. Id. § 2(9).
229. Iraqi Freedom From Debt Act: House Bill supra note 223, § 3(b).
230. Alan Murray, U.S. Can't Avoid Messy Negotiations Over Iraq's Debt, WALL ST. J., Apr.
15, 2003, at A4 available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3964794.
231. Those Odious Debts: Should Those Who Lent to Saddam Get Their Money Back?, supra
note 222, at 13.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Solomon, et al., supra note 214 (referring to Min Su Kwang, Executive VP in charge of
foreign contracts of Hyundai).
235. Id.
236. Id. (explaining that South Korea has already filed lawsuits in New York and London, but
is willing to settle these once a permanent Iraqi government is in place).
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C. Paris Club
The Paris Club is the third and final alternative to debt resolution.
It is an informal composition of creditor countries that restructures
government debt.237 Formed in 1956, it consists of nineteen perma-
nent member countries, 238 yet other countries can be invited to par-
ticipate on a case-by-case basis.239 Restructuring includes changing
and lengthening the time of repayment, deferring some payments
completely, or reducing interest charges. 240 Debt cancellation is not
an option.241 Pursuant to its rules and regulations, the decisions are
made on a case-by-case basis and by consensus. 242 By using the Paris
Club, there will be multilateral agreements as to how Iraq's debts
should be treated, rather than a unilateral decision reached by the
United States. For the debtor-nations not part of the Paris Club and
not invited to join the Paris Club, this alternative is still beneficial as it
can be used as a model on how debt restructuring can be achieved.
All the debtor-nations can form one international committee,
modeled after the Paris Club, specifically to adjudicate the debts of
Iraq.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is evident from this paper, that there is no simple solution that
will equally please all parties involved. It is also clear that compro-
mise is the key. Perhaps discussions can begin with regard to the crea-
tion of an international arbitral body similar to the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal. In 1981, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal was estab-
lished pursuant to the Algiers Accord in order to settle claims arising
out of debts, expropriation, and contracts affecting property rights be-
tween the United States and Iran.243 For some, this Tribunal has been
237. Davis, et al., supra note 214.
238. These members are: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, United Kingdom, and United States. See http://www.clubdeparis.org.
239. The following countries have been invited to participate: Abu Dhabi, South Africa, Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Korea, Israel, Kuwait, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Portugal, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Turkey. See http://www.clubdeparis.org.
240. Davis et al., supra note 214.
241. Id.
242. See http://www.clubdeparis.org.
243. Salamy, supra note 208, at 291. These claims arose from several years of increasing hos-
tility between the United States and Iran and culminated in Iran seizing U.S. hostages. In re-
sponse, the President of the United States froze Iranian assets located in U.S. banks. Id. at 287-
89. Months later, the United States and Iran negotiated the release of the hostages and the
assets, signed the Algiers Accord, and brought inter-governmental and private-party state claims
before the Tribunal as a means to resolve any claims existing prior to 1981. Id. at 289.
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described as "the most significant arbitral body in history '244 as it has
successfully resolved "almost all of the approximately 4,700 private
U.S. claims '2 45 and is in the process of adjudicating a number of inter-
governmental claims. 246 Likewise, disputes surrounding the Saddam
Contracts may be resolved through an equivalent international body.
Regardless of whether or not arbitration is the path taken, the Pre-
War Multinationals, the United States, and Iraq need to cooperate
and create a multilateral approach in resolving their disputes. As with
Afghanistan, the United Nations should be involved in the establish-
ment of the permanent government in Iraq in order to ensure that one
country's interests will not prevail to the detriment of the Iraqi peo-
ple. Finally, businessmen and legal scholars from around the world
should begin to discuss forming a steering committee through which
Iraq can receive valuable advice, management, and training with re-
gard to its oil, the establishment of rule of law, and foreign direct
investment.
244. David. D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran- United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving
Structure of International Dispute Resolution, 84 A.J.I.L. 104 (1990) (quoting THE IRAN-UNITED
STATES CLAIM TRIBUNAL 1981-1983 viii (R. Lillich ed. 1984)).
245. U.S. Dept. of State, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/
3199pf.htm.
246. Id.
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